The Factive Turn in Epistemology

Country: Austria

City: Vienna

Abstr. due: 15.12.2014

Dates: 07.05.15 — 07.05.15

Area Of Sciences: Philosophy;

Organizing comittee e-mail:

Organizers: University of Vienna


Good reasons for belief used to be one a penny. Even brains in vats had
them. But recently epistemologists have become pickier, and are
beginning to think that only facts, true propositions, or factive mental
states can be good reasons for belief. This Factive Turn has been
variously motivated by considerations from philosophy of mind (e.g.,
Williamson), practical reason (e.g., Littlejohn), metaethics (e.g.,
Alvarez, Dancy), and philosophy of perception (e.g., Pritchard).
Naturally, the Turn - like any other flourishing research programme -
has attracted plenty of critical attention (e.g., McGlynn). This
workshop aims at bringing together philosophers working on the factivity
of epistemic reasons. Topics include:

1.Are good epistemic reasons facts or mental states?

2.If reasons are mental states, do only factive types count as good

3.If reasons are factive and psychological, do we need to insist on
factive mental state types? Won’t veridical tokens of non-factive states
– e.g., true beliefs – do just as well?

4.Would the factivity of epistemic reasons commit us to metaphysical

5.Are good reasons and the believer’s reasons of different ontological

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